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The nonparametric approach to consumer-demand analysis—based on revealed-preference
axioms-is reviewed. Particular attention is paid to questions of size and power of tests for
consistency of data with the existence of a stable, well-behaved utility function that could
have generated the data. An application to Australian meat demand is used to show how these
notions can be quantified and how prior information about elasticities, following Sakong and
Hayes, may be used to increase the power of the approach.
Consumer demand analysis has become increas-
ingly difficult for the applied economist over the
past 25 years or so. Twenty-five years ago, a sin-
gle-equation linear or double-log demand equa-
tion, estimated using OLS, would have been re-
garded as generally acceptable (and publishable),
so long as the coefficients were plausible and there
were no obvious statistical problems with the
model, Nowadays, such models are mostly
scorned in applied work. It is virtually obligatory
to estimate demand parameters in the context of a
system of demand equations based on some flexi-
ble functional form. The use of flexible forms, of
course, is meant to avoid the joint hypothesis that
preferences are of a particular assumed form, say
CES, that is inherent in more traditional specifica-
tions. These requirements thus represent a move-
ment in the direction of avoiding the imposition of
restrictions that are not desirable, and not implied
by theory, while permitting the imposition or test-
ing of restrictions that are implied by theory.
Even when flexible forms are used, there are
important econometric specification issues remain-
ing to be dealt with. For instance, how do we know
that the results would not be different with an al-
ternative functional form? Should the equations be
estimated with SUR, or should the possibility of
simultaneity bias be recognized? Is a price-
dependent or quantity-dependent system more ap-
propriate? How should the structure of dynamics in
the error term be specified? Is a trend, a Chow test,
or some other technique most appropriate for de-
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tecting structural change? Should the model be
first-differenced? The implication is that results are
conditional on such specification choices and must
be heavily qualified.
Nonparametric demand analysis—as Varian has
termed it—holds the potential to allow conclusions
to be drawn with fewer qualifications. The method
uses only the conditions imposed on a data set by
utility maximization, through revealed-preference
axioms. Simply put, the method does not involve
the use of any assumed (parametric) functional
forms for demands; hence, it is rsonparametricand
avoids altogether the problem of functional form.
In addition, since the method does not involve re-
gression, it avoids all of the specification concerns
that arise in any regression analysis. Nonparamet-
ric demand analysis is thus free from econometric
specification errors-those that involve regression
problems—although it still must contend with
what might be called economic specification er-
rors—those such as erroneous assumptions con-
cerning weak separability or aggregation over
goods or consumers, However, it is fair to say that
there are many unresolved questions concerning
how useful the method will prove to be in applied
work. Nonparametric methods are attractive in part
because they avoid the fragility of inferences aris-
ing from whimsical specification choices in para-
metric models. The counterpoint to this apparent
advantage is a concern about the properties of in-
ferences obtained using the nonparametric ap-
proach, and a reasonable question to ask is whether
the results from nonparametric methods would
withstand any better an intense scrutiny such as we
now impose on parametric results.
Below we illustrate how nonparametric demand
analysis might be used to check consistency with
the underlying theory, test the stability of prefer-126 October 1992
ences, and test weak separability. We review ap-
proaches that have been proposed to increase the
power of the tests and report on results from ap-
plying these methods using data on Australia’s
quarterly per capita consumption of beef, lamb,
pork, and chicken from 1970:2 to 1988:4. These
data (from Alston and Chalfant 1991b) are similar
to those we analyzed earlier (Chalfant and Alston)
except that mutton is excluded, we have additional
years, and some observations are slightly revised.
Progress in Applications of Nonparametric
Methods in Demand Analysis
The nonparametric approach to demand analysis
uses the results of revealed-preference theory, first
established by Samuelson (1938, 1948) and
Houthakker, and more recently advanced by Koo
(1963, 1971), Afriat, Varian (1982, 1983), and
others. The early papers were aimed at establishing
the properties of demands and preferences from
observable decisions, rather than from axioms of
behavior or arbitrarily assumed utility functions.
More recently, the tendency in this literature has
been to recognize revealed preference not as a sub-
stitute for utility theory, but as a set of observable
implications of utility theory, making it possible to
draw inferences from utility theory directly and to
test whether those inferences are supported by par-
ticular data sets. Nonparametric methods have
been developed to test data for consistency with
utility maximization (i.e., the tests for consistency
of data with the weak, strong, or generalized axi-
oms of revealed preference-WARP, SARP, and
GARP), homotheticity (HARP), weak separabil-
ity, and a rationing model (Varian 1983), and to
recover the properties of the underlying prefer-
ences and forecast demand behavior (Varian
1982). Varian (1992) summarizes much of the rel-
evant theory. 1
Although it would seem reasonable to expect
researchers to apply the tests for consistency (at a
minimum, WARP) as a matter of course in any
demand analysis, the total number of studies that
have applied the nonparametric approach remains
small, and only a very small fraction of journal
articles that report parametric demand systems also
report whether the data were tested for consistency
‘ Inparticuhw,Varian (1992)or Variarr(1982)shouldbe consultedfor
a clarification of the differencesbetween the variousrevealed-preference
axioms. When the distinction is unimportant, werefer to GARP through-
out the paper, atthoughthe statements made usually will not require that
any practicaldistinction bemadebetweenSARPand GARP. We refer
specifically to WARP in cases where the statement involves only pair-
wise comparisons of bundfes,
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with GARP. 2 The low popularity of the nonpara-
metric approach is surprising, given its potential to
complement a parametric approach; for instance, a
check for consistency with revealed preference
seems useful as a pretest for any demand analysis.
The explanation appears to be primarily that peo-
ple lack confidence in the capacity of the nonpara-
metric methods to provide definitive results. This
has been described by some as an issue of power.
Is a failure to reject consistency of the data with
GARP strong evidence of the absence of structural
change, or could the data be consistent with re-
vealed preference even in the presence of substan-
tial structural change?
As discussed by Landsburg, Varian (1982),
Thurman, and Chalfant and Alston, when income
growth is large compared to relative price varia-
tion, as in the case of aggregate consumption se-
ries, one is unlikely to find a violation of revertled-
preference axioms. Each bundle of goods will be
revealed preferred to all previous ones, and effec-
tively there will be no comparable data points.
Chalfant and Alston (and more recently Alston and
Chalfant 1991a) suggested that when the data are
such that nonparametric tests are low-powered,
parametric tests are likely also to be low-powered.
This discussion raises two further questions. First,
what is the power of the nonparametric test, what
are its determinants in a particular application, and
how does it compare to the power of a correspond-
ing parametric test? Second, what can be done to
enhance the power of the nonparametric tests? In
relation to the first question, there is little evidence
available in the literature, 3In relation to the second
question, there has been some progress with meth-
ods for improving the power of the nonparametric
test. Progress in this direction seems to require
imposing nonsample evidence on the data. For ex-
ample, Chalfant and Alston adjusted their data for
expenditure growth in order to increase the number
of comparable data points, but to do so, it was
necessary to assume values for income elastici-
ties.4 More recently, Sakong and Hayes have bor-
2 Empirical studies that have used nonpamruetric methods in con-
sumer demand analysis include Landsburg; Swofford and Whitney
(1986, 1987, 1988); Chavas and Cox (1987); Chalfant and Alston
(1988); Cox and Chavas (1988, 1990);Belongia and Chalfant; Alston,
Carter, Green, and Pick Belongia and Chrystal; Burton and Young;
Jensen and Bevins; Sakong and Hayes; and Fisher, Examples of para-
metric studies that checked for consistency with GARP include Alston
and Chalfarrt (1987), Thurman (1987), Chalfant (1987), Barnhart and
Whitney, Alston and Chaffant(1991), Piggott, Piggott and Griffith, and
Wellman.
3Exceptions arc the papers by Bronura, A1zcorbe, and Afston and
Chalfant (1991a).
4They assumedthat expenditureelasticities were all nne in transforur-
ing the data, but tlds is not the same as testing GARP subject to aAlston and Cha~ant Consumer Demand Analysis According to GARP 127
rowed from the literature on applications of non-
parametric methods to producer problems (Chavas
and Cox 1990) to develop a test for consistency of
data with maximization of utility, subject to re-
strictions on the utility function. Their method
yields the implied set of expenditure elasticities
that will minimize a measure of the set of “taste
changes” necessary to make the data consistent
with GARP, and it can be applied subject to re-
strictions on those expenditure elasticities.
This paper explores the issue of power of non-
parametric tests for consistency of data with utility
maximization. Particular attention is paid to the
application of developments, such as that by Sa-
kong and Hayes, that are designed to impose re-
strictions in the nonparametric approach, so as to
increase the ability to glean results from the data,
while avoiding the imposition of restrictions (such
as functional form) that we cannot believe with





The weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP)
states that a bundle of goods, q~,is revealed to be
prefemed to any other bundle, q2, (denoted q1Z?q2)
that could have been purchased instead (i.e., ql is
revealed to be preferred to all other bundles within
the budget line when ql is purchased). The weak
axiom is violated if any such bundle q2 is also
revealed to be preferred to bundle ql (i.e., ql lies
within the budget line that applies when q2 is pur-
chased). Such a result implies that both q1Rq2and
q2Rq1, which could occur only if indifference
curves had shifted, given our maintained hypoth-
eses of utility maximization and an absence of
measurement errors in the data.
A WARP violation in a two-good case is illus-
trated in Figure 1. On the vertical axis is shown
consumption of good 2 (say chicken), and on the
horizontal axis is shown the consumption of good
1 (say beef). Two budget constraints are shown,
one with a relatively high chicken price (time 1,
say 1960) and one with a relatively low chicken
price (time 2, say 1990). In time 1 the consump-
tion bundle is ql at price vectorpl with expenditure
of El = pjql, and in time 2 the consumption bun-
restriction ontheincomeelasticities,becausethereis norestriction on
theelasticities in the test with the transformeddata. The same pmcedum
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Figure 1. A WARP Violation
dle is q2 at price vector p2 with expenditure of E2
= p2’q2. In time 1, qlllqz while in time 2, qxql,
which is a violation of WARP. 5
Some other possibilities also are illustrated in
Figure 1. For example, if the bundle in time 1had
been qj instead of ql, there would be no viola-
tion-qjRgz; however, the converse is not true.
Similarly, if the bundle in time 2 had been qj in-
stead of qz, there would be no violation+~l?q ,—
but the converse is not true. Alternatively, if the
two bundles had been q; (instead of ql) and qj
(instead of q2), neither would be revealed preferred
to the other—the bundles are not comparable in
such a case.
Let us now generalize this discussion to N
goods. If the T by N matrix P consists of T ob-
served price vectors of length N, and the T by N
matrix Q consists of the corresponding bundles of
quantities consumed, then each element Cij of the
matrix C = PQ’ gives the cost, at time i prices, of
buying time j’s bundle of goods. Thus, the ele-
ments in column j’ give the cost, at various price
vectors, of obtaining the consumption bundle qj,
while the elements in any row i allow a comparison
s Note that in order to generate a WARP violation, we have contrived
a counterfactual situation in whkh a chicken-intensive bundle was con-
sumed inperiod 1whenchicken was relativelyexpensive. Whh onlytwo
goods, holdlng expenditure constant, it appears that a WARP violation
can be generated only by one price rising and tbe other one falling, so
that budget lines cross, with an increase in consumption of the good
whose price bas risen and a decrease in consumption of the guod whose
price bas faflen.Thus, the only way to have a WARP violation and have
the trendsin datathat haveoccurredin mostcountries (a downwardtrend
in the price and increasing consumption of chkken) is to include more
than two goods, If the pork price, say, also moves with tbe prices of
chicken andbeef, a WARP violationthat does not requirechicken prices
to rise corddbe generated. The only practical importanceof this result is
that it indicates that testing for stable preferences using WARP and only
two goods against an alternative hypothesis of increased preference for
chicken is possible only for certain patterns of relative prices, but this
does illustrate the importance of adequately defining the relevant group
of guuds for the analysis.128 October 1992 NJARE
of the costs of various bundles at the fixed set of
prices pi.
A time series of prices and quantities of N goods
can be checked easily for consistency with the
weak axiom of revealed preference.b It is conve-
nient to summarize this information using a matrix
@, which is defined by dividing every element of
C, CO,by the corresponding diagonal element, Cii.
A WARP violation corresponds to finding both @v
and @ji iess than one. The absence of any such
violations is consistent with stable, well-behaved
preferences. However, finding that the data are
consistent with the weak axiom does not rule out
the problem of intransitivity. Even when there is
no WARP violation with qi and qj, it is necessary
also to check for consistency with the strong axiom
(SARP). This involves a search for intransitivity in
the data to see if a combination of bundles qi, qj,
and q~ can be found that together imply q#?qk,
qflqj~ and q~qi. The number Ofbundles Ofgoods
that can come between qi and qj is limited only by
the size of the data set. The data are consistent with
SARP if no such intransitivities are found using 0.
When no such violations are found, it is possible to
“rationalize” the data—the data could have been
generated by the maximization of a stable, well-
behaved utility function.
The Australian meat consumption data are con-
sistent with WARP, SARP, and GARP. Thus, the
data could have been generated by the maximiza-
tion of utility, with the goods comprising a weakly
separable group, and it follows that the imposition
of symmetry, homogeneity, and adding-up condi-
tions in a parametric system could therefore be
justified (although they might not hold in a partic-
ular form). The only distinction between GARP
and SARP is that GARP allows multiple solutions
to the consumer’s optimization problem for a given
price vector and total expenditure (i.e., a given
budget constraint). Since, as is likely in such data
sets, we never observed an exact repeat observa-
6To illustrate the simplicity of these computations using SHAZAM
(White et al. 1990), checking WARP consists of the following steps,
assuming that variables PI – PN and Q, – QNare available:
COPY PI-PN PRICES
COPY Q1-QN QUANTS
MATRIX C = PRICES*(QUANTA’);
MATRIX D = INV(DIAG(DIAG(C)))
MATRIX PHI = D*C
DO# = I,N
GENII =#+l
DO % = I,N
MATRIX PHI#% = PHI(#,%)
MATRIX PHI%# = PHI(%,#)




tion of the budget constraint in this data set, there
were no opportunities to observe a violation of
SARP that was not also a violation of GARP (as
can arise only when two different consumption
bundles are chosen for two different observations
with an identical budget constraint). Both GARP
and SARP, of course, imply WARP.
Separability
Varian (1983) considers testing separability using
GARP. The method, briefly, consists of checking
whether subgroups of goods satisfy GARP sepa-
rately and whether aggregates then satisfy GARP
in a‘’ first-stage utility function. ” The latter step is
checked, in Varian’s software, by attempting to
construct the so-called Afriat numbers (Varian
1983).
Barnett and Choi have shown convincingly that
this latter requirement is too strong; that is, Vari-
an’s test will reject separability y too often. On the
other hand, since satisfying GARP in each sub-
group is necessary but not sufficient, finding that a
subset of goods violates GARP is sufficient to re-
ject weak separability. If a subset of goods passes
GARP, one may still want to worry about the suf-
ficient conditions related to the first stage.
Several studies have used Varian’s test for sep-
arability, including Alston, Carter, Green, and
Pick; Belongia and Chalfant; Belongia and Chrys-
tal; and Swofford and Whitney (1987, 1988). Al-
though there are some questions about the inter-
pretation of the results from either the necessary
condition alone (i.e., GARP applied to subgroups
of goods) or the necessary and sufficient condi-
tions together (i.e., GARP plus the Afriat inequal-
ities), the results of both tests are of interest.
We noted that the Australian data are consistent
with GARP. Thus, at least one of the conditions
for separability has been met. The results from
testing various subgroups of the Australian meat
consumption data indicate that none of the sub-
groups satisfy both the necessary and sufficient
conditions, and only one subgrouping—{beef and
chicken} and {lamb and pork&--satisfied the nec-
essary conditions for separability y. Prior beliefs
alone are probably sufficient to convince most ag-
ricultural economists that chicken and beef are not
weakly separable from lamb and pork, so it is not
surprising that the Afriat conditions do not hold in
this case.
Interpretation-Size and Power of the
Nonparametric Tests
The results above may be interpreted as supporting
the view that the Australian meat consumption dataAlston and Chaljanf Consumer Demand Analysis According to GARP 129
set represents a weakly separable group of goods in
which all of the restrictions from consumer theory
can be assumed to hold. However, questions have
been raised in the literature about the appropriate
interpretation of such findings. Can the results be
taken with any confidence, or must there be a very
large structural change in demand before it can be
detected by GARP, as was suggested by the results
of Alston and Chalfant (199Ia)-that is, what is
the so-called power of the test? Suppose that a
violation was detected, as occurred with Chalfant
and Alston. Does that mean that utility theory must
be abandoned, or is there a measurement-error in-
terpretation-that is, what is the size of the test?
The nonparametric tests are capable of yielding
both false positives and false negatives, and rela-
tively little is known about either, especially the
latter.
“Size” of the Tests
The nonparametric tests based on revealed prefer-
ence include no provision for the fact that prices
and quantities are likely to be measured with error.
It is possible to think of each observed quantity as
being made up of two components, the true quan-
tity and a measurement error.7 It is the true quan-
tities that are of interest and that should be tested
for consistency with utility maximization, not
those measured with some error. The “size” ques-
tion then becomes whether there can be con-
structed a set of” small” measurement errors to be
subtracted from the observed quantities in such a
way so as to satisfy GARP. Varian (1985) has
shown how a comparison of the variance implied
by the constructed measurement errors to a hypoth-
esized value permits significance levels to be as-
signed to the deviations from consistency.
To see how this might work, consider Figure 2,
which duplicates the WARP violation that was de-
picted in Figure 1. In this figure, we can consider
what sizes of measurement errors (i.e., adjust-
ments of the observed quantities) would be neces-
sary to eliminate the WARP violation. For exam-
ple, consider the quantity of beef (good 1) in time
1. In order to eliminate the violation, we could
either increase ql 1 to ~1, or reduce ql 1 to ~1,
holding the consumption of chicken constant at
q21.In the first case, increasing ql ~to fll shifts the
time 1 budget constraint to the right in parallel to
the point where the time 2 consumption bundle is
7Tbe same can be said of prices. Keeping with the practice to date,
we take observed prices and expmdhores as exact, and focus on mea-
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Figure 2. Measurement Error and WARP Vi-
olation=ize of WARP Tests
no longer revealed preferred to it. In the second
case, reducing ql ~to ~1 shifts the time 1 budget
constraint to the left in parallel to the point where
the time 1 consumption bundle is no longer re-
vealed preferred to that in time 2. That is, a pos-
itive or-negative error in measuring the quantity of
good 1 in time 1 could have accounted for the
WARP violation, and the minimum size of either a
positive, or a negative, measurement error neces-
sary to remove the violation can be computed from
the data. Another useful insight from Figure 2 is
that, everything else equal, a violation of WARP
requires that consumption of good 1in time 1must
lie in the range between ~1 and #l.
Clearly, since we chose good 1 and time 1 ar-
bitrarily for this illustration, positive or negative
measurement errors in either good, at either time
period, could account for the violation, so there are
eight possible cases to consider (two goods by two
time periods by two directions for errors). Thus we
can define a set of ranges for each of the goods in
each of the time periods that are consistent with the
WARP violation. More generally, some combina-
tion of such errors could be considered and a pro-
gramming algorithm may be applied to calculate
the minimum sizes of such errors necessary to ad-
just a data set in order to achieve consistency with
GARP (Varian 1985). Such information permits a
judgment to be made about whether the measure-
ment-error interpretation of a violation is plausi-
ble, or whether the necessary adjustment to the
data is too great to be plausible as a measurement
error.
Chalfant and Alston found that small adjust-
ments to Martin and Porter’s Australian meat con-
sumption data (consistent with two small measure-
ment errors in mutton consumption) were suffi-
cient to achieve consistency with GARP. Burton130 October 1992 N.IARE
and Young found that a similar set of adjustments
in U.K. beef consumption could explain the vio-
lations of GARP that they found. Another exam-
ple, in the context of the demand for money, is
provided by Belongia and Chrystal. These studies
illustrate how one could reduce the size of the test
for consistency (i.e., reduce the probability of a
false rejection of stable preferences) by allowing
small departures from the revealed-preference ax-
ioms. However, much more work is required be-
fore particular rejection probabilities can be asso-
ciated with such conditions. 8
“Power” of the Tests
There are several notions of power worth consid-
ering. All relate to the probability of rejecting the
null hypothesis that the data were generated by
maximization of a stable, well-behaved utility
function. The first concept focuses on quantities
and involves measurement error, as did the discus-
sion of size, that is, by how much would a partic-
ular quantity have to change before it could no
longer be believed to be consistent with the utility
function that generated the other observations? By
how much would a quantity have to be mis-
measured before GARP detected the error? In Fig-
ure 2 we saw the range for good 1in time 1needed
to generate a WARP violation. In order to deter-
mine power, we need to see what sizes of mea-
surement errors are necessary to shift the budget
constraint into such a range, and thereby generate
a WARP violation, when the data are initially con-
sistent with WARP. If that amount were large,
power could be said to be low,
Figure 3 corresponds closely to Figure 2, but, in
Figure 3, the budget constraint in time 1 is drawn
farther to the right so that there is not a WARP
violation: q1Rq2, but the converse is not true.
Thus, in order to induce a WARP violation by
adjusting ql ~,we cartshift the time 1 budget con-
straint in parallel to the left to a quantity between
41 and &. This is consistent with a positive
shock to ql ~that 1sat least as rest as e] = q]l-fll,
8 but no more than e2 = ql ~- ~~.The power of the
test will be large if el is small relative to plausible
sampling (measurement) errors and ez is large rel-
ative to plausible sampling errors. As with the
“size” of the tests, the problem becomes more
complicated when we consider more than two
goods, more than two observations, measurement
s Varian (1985, 1988)and Tsur (1989, 1991)provide discussions of
testa with measurementerrors. See Burton and Young for an application




Figure 3. Measurement Error and WARP Vi-
olations-Power of WARP Tests
errors in prices as well as quantities, joint distri-
butions when we have combinations of multiple
measurement errors, and intransitivities (i.e.,
SARP rather than WARP).
This is one concept of power. Another relates to
the extent to which the data contain comparable
observations (i.e., at least one is revealed prefemed
to the other) and, where there are comparable ob-
servations, the extent to which the data are domi-
nated by income growth, Chalfant and Alston
characterized this problem in terms of the proper-
ties of the@ matrix. The ratios in @, @ij= CU/Cii,
indicate whether the bundle of time j quantities
was affordable at time i prices: a ratio less than one
indicates q~qj. A WARP violation occurs when
two matching off-diagonal elements in the @ ma-
trix are both less than one: that is, @u < 1 and
@ji< 1.
When real expenditures are rising through time,
it is likely that the cost at time i of buying bundles
purchased earlier in the sample will be less than
expenditures at time i. Similarly, the cost of any
bundle purchased later in the sample, when mea-
sured using time i prices, it likely to exceed actual
expenditure at time i. An extreme case is when
every consumption bundle is revealed preferred to
every previous consumption bundle and when cur-
rent expenditure is not sufficient to afford the cost
of any future bundle, when measured at current
prices, In such a case, all of the elements of @
above the diagonal would be greater than one, and
all of the elements below the diagonal would be
less than one. To have any chance of finding a
WARP violation requires that at least some ele-
ments of @ be less than one on both sides of the
diagonal. Thus, intuitively, WARP violations willAlston and Cha~ant ConsumerDemand Analysis According to GARP 131
be unlikely in data sets in which there are few
instances of @u < 1 on one side of the diagonal.
Any procedure that increases the number of in-
stances of @u < 1 will increase the chances of
finding a violation. Chalfant and Alston (p. 404)
calculated the numbers of observations above and
below the diagonals in their annual U.S. data and
their quarterly Australian data. In the Australian
data set, they found 1,345 observations of @v<1
below the diagonal and 1,088 above the diagonal,
which led them to suggest that “concerns over
power need not be great. ” This is true for the
concern over rising expenditures, at any rate. Their
results with U.S. data showed only 73 observa-
tions of CEti <1 above the diagonal and 581 below
the diagonal, a less satisfactory situation. In our
revised Australian data, there are 1,456 cases of
@u< 1 above the diagonal and 1,427 cases below.
Such evidence is only circumstantial in relation to
the power of the nonparametric tests, that is, it
indicates only that it is at least feasible to find
violations, not whether they are probable nor
whether only very large taste changes will be de-
tected.9
Finally, power also depends on relative prices,
the nature of the consumption data, and the nature
of the hypothesized shift in preferences. An exam-
ple adapted from Gross illustrates this point. Sup-
pose that the underlying utility function is of the
Cobb-Douglas form:
~ = x1~lx2~2.
In time 1, txl = .9 and Uz = .1, while the values
are reversed for time 2. As is well-known, the a’s
give the utility-maximizing budget shares. Sup-
pose income is $10,000 in both time periods. Fi-
nally, suppose that in time 1, prices are $99 for
good 1 and $101 for good 2, while in period 2,
both prices are $100. Thus, optimal consumption
in time 1 is 10.1 of good 1 and 89.11 of good 2
(ensuring budget shares of.9 and. 1, respectively),
while in period 2, it is 90 units of good 1and 10of
good 2.
This is obviously a large change in preferences
between two data points; it is much larger than
g Chalfant and Alston also dk.cussed the interpretation of the size of
the elements of the @ matrix as indication of the severity of a WARP
violation. They inferred that in a case where both 00 and 0,, am both
less than one, but veryclose to one, as they foundin the Australiandata,
the violation might be attributable to small measurement error. Such
inferences should be drawn with great cam. Gross shows, usiog Cobb-
Douglas utility functions, how two consumers with very different utility
fimctionsmay be characterized by @uarrd@jiclose to one. Thus, while
amatlchanges in quantities mightrestore consistency with GARP, this is
no guarantee that the underlying preferences were, in fact, stable. He
sugges~, insead, using a money metric utility function in order tO
evrduate the importance of violations in terms of the necessary adjust-
ment in expenditures.
what we think we are testing for in typical meat
demand studies. Let us consider checking these
data points using WARP. It turns out that @12 =
.992 (Gross, p. 417). Calculating @zl yields
.9012, and a violation of WARP. That is an en-
couraging result. Under the assumption that the
data were generated without measurement errors,
WARP detected the shift in the preferences. How-
ever, had consumption in period 2 of the first good
been higher by just .81 (due to either measurement
error or an increase in expenditures spent only on
that good), the ratio @lz would equal one and the
WARP violation would vanish. This shows that
certain patterns of preference shifts and relative
prices, although they may represent substantial de-
partures from the null hypothesis, may not be de-
tected. Of course, this example is somewhat arti-
ficial, since only two data points were used and
there was little variation in relative mites. It does
illustrate the importance of determi~ing the region
in which WARP or GARP violations would be
detected to develop a feel for the power of the test.
A formal approach to this calculation can be
taken. A useful thing to know would be, for a
given price vector and level of expenditures, what
range of observations for quantities would be vio-
lations of stable preferences and what range would
not. For instance, we should be able to state a
decision rule analogous to what can be done with
statistical hypothesis tests. If the outcome is in the
“critical region, ” we reject the null hypothesis,
while we continue to maintain it for all other out-
comes. What quantities of consumption for meats,
next period, would lead us to reject stability?
We have outlined already with the figures for
the two-good case how one could do such an anal-
ysis for any data point. We attempted a simple
simulation, for each of our goods, to see by how
much we would have to change each data point
before we generated a violation of WARP. 10Sim-
ply by adding or subtracting small increments to
each observed quantity, one should be able to find
out how large X inte~al around that quantity there
is before a violation is encountered. We were sur-
prised, at first, to find that the results were occa-
sionally sensitive to step-size; that is, it was some-
times possible to jump completely over the rela-
tively small region where two data points were
comparable. But, as shown in Figure 3, such an
outcome is to be expected because there is both an
upper and a lower limit of measurement errors that
10For simPliciV, we checked only WARP and nOtGARp, ‘0 ‘y-
tbing we found about the probability of a violation of consistency is a
lower bound on the true probability.132 October 1992 NJARE
will lead to a WARP violation, complicating the
design of experiments to measure power.
Consider two data points, observed at times 1
and 2. Price vectors are PI and p2, and the corre-
sponding quantity vectors are q~ and q2, so that
total observed expenditures are Cl ~and C22(where
CU = pi’qj, as defined earlier). A violation of
WARP occurs if C12< Cll (@12< 1) and C21<
C22(’321< 1). This may be stated as: Clz – Cll
<0 and C21 – C22 <0 (i.e., pl’[q2 – ql] <0
and p2’[ql – q2] < O). Suppose there currently is
not a violation of WARP between observations 1
and 2. What could cause one? Below we consider
three alternative scenarios and show how to calcu-
late changes in the quantity qlj of a particular good
j at time 1 (as adjustments to correct for hypothet-
ical measurement errors) necessary to generate a
WARP violation:
Case 1: @12<1 (pl’[q2 – ql] < O)and
o~l >1 (p2’[ql – q2] > o).
In this case, to cause a WARP violation, we have
to increase C22relative to C21. To do this we can
either increase q2 or reduce ql. Considering the
particular observation of goodj, in time 1, qlj, the
adjustment necessary to make C21 – Czz < 0 is
given by Aqlj < [C22 – C21]Jp2j,which is nega-
tive. However, reducing qlj also affects 01 z
through Cl ~; the adjustment to qlj can cause a
WARP violation only so long as it does not also
lead to a decrease in Cl ~sufficient to make C12 –
Cl ~>0. Thus, there is also a maximum reduction
in qlj so that Aqlj > [C12 – Cl ll/plj, which is also
negative. Clearly, as discussed earlier, such a
range may or may not exist for each good in each
time period. One way to learn about which obser-
vations are informative or influential in a particular
data set is to construct bounds such as these.
Case 2: @12>1 (pl’[q2 – ql] > O)and
021<1 (&’[ql – q2] == o).
This case is the converse of case 1. In order to
generate a WARP violation, we must increase qlj
by an amount that satisfies both inequalities in [C22
– CzJ]/pzj ~ Aqlj ~ [C12 – Cll]/plj, which may
or may not be feasible.
Case 3:012>1 (pl’[q2 – ql] > O) and
@~l >1 (p2’[ql – q2] > o).
In this case, in order to generate a WARP viola-
tion, it is necessary to make at least two adjust-
ments (i.e., increasing ql. would move @12in the
i’ right direction, but it wou d move 021 in the wrong
direction). For example, one could increase qlj and
decrease q2j. Generating a WARP violation in this
manner should be most likely when the relative
prices of the two goods change a lot between the
two periods. For instance, increasing qlj to in-
crease Cl, has the greatest effect when plj is large
and, at the same time, has the least effect on in-
creasing C21when p2j is small. While determining
what will cause a violation of GARP involving a
number of data points is more complicated, the
role of relative price changes seems clear: other
things equal, more variation in relative prices will
likely increase the power of the nonparametric ap-
proach.
Increasing the Power of the Tests by Imposing
Prior Beliefs
We have shown a procedure by which it is possible
to describe the events that would lead to a rejection
of stable preferences. Alternatively, it permits us
to define all combinations of bundles of goods,
prices, and expenditures that are compatible with
the preferences that are consistent with a given set
of observations, which has the potential to improve
our understanding of what can be learned from
nonparametric tests and what can be done to in-
crease their power. A similar exercise could pre-
sumably be undertaken in any parametric study,
perhaps using tests for influential data points, al-
though we know of no examples.
The work of Sakong and Hayes represents the
most ambitious attempt to date to impose prior
beliefs in the nonparametric approach. It is also a
major innovation in the nonparametric approach.
They noted (as did Chalfant and Alston) that if the
preferences that rationalize the data also imply
properties that are considered to be implausible,
such as that one of the goods is inferior, it might be
better to conclude that the data cannot be rational-
ized. The method of adjusting the data and retest-
ing GARP, as in Chalfant and Alston, is unattrac-
tive since results depend on the elasticities chosen
for the adjustment. Sakong and Hayes reformu-
lated the problem as one of computing the set of
expenditure elasticities that minimizes the taste
changes necessary to rationalize the data. This
is a straightforward linear programming problem.
They then measured the minimum taste changes
necessary to rationrdize the data, subject to the
constraint that expenditure elasticities for all meats
are non-negative.
The key insight behind this approach is that it is
the compensated demands, adjusted for changes in
money income and prices, that should be tested for
stability, This way, one avoids altogether the prob-Alston and Chaffam Consumer Demand Analysis According to GARP 133
lems associated with rising total expenditure that
had been identified in the previous literature. How-
ever, it means that expenditure elasticities are used
for more than adjusting for changes in expenditure,
since they provide information on allowable re-
sponses to price changes (in the form of the income
effect). One is free to add any other constraints on
elasticities, such as a smoothness constraint. Sa-
kong and Hayes added a constraint on how much
the expenditure elasticities could change from ob-
servation to observation. An alternative is simply
to constrain their ranges, since expenditure elastic-
ities might change by a large amount between two
data points, if relative prices happened to change
greatly.
Sakong and Hayes used meat consumption data
sets for a number of countries, including one for
U.S. meat consumption that is essentially the same
as that used by Chalfant and Alston, except that
Sakong and Hayes deleted fish. They used a
smaller sample, but it includes the years in which
most observers speculate that there was a shift in
preferences away from beef and toward chicken. 11
They found that their per capita U.S. data for beef,
pork, and chicken were consistent with GARP, but
that, when income elasticities were restricted to be
non-negative, some violations of WARP were ob-
served. Imposing a smoothness constraint on the
fitted expenditure elasticities increased the implied
taste changes somewhat, as one would expect. 12
Sakong and Hayes noted that the preference shifts
they found were of roughly the same magnitudes
as those obtained by Moschini and Meilke, using
different data and different techniques, lending
some support to both sets of results. As noted ear-
lier, this illustrates one use of the nonparametric
approach. Finding that data are consistent with
GARP can be used as prior justification for expect-
ing demand theory (i,e., symmetry, homogeneity)
to hold in a particular parametric demand system.
Sakong and Hayes have taken this one step further,
II ~leting Ob~ematiOns from the nonparamerricapprOachis likely tO
have little effect on the comparisons between data puints that remain.
Sakong and Hayes, for instarrce, obviously cannot say anything about
taste changes prior to 1971, since their data include the years 1971 to
1984, but the comparisons within their sample are likely to be a lot less
sensitive to the inclusion of the early years than are parametric results.
The only way the presence or absence of, say, 1970 could matter in
deteetingany shifts in preferencesbetween 1971and 1984is if there was
some intrarrsitivity that would not be detected, of the form q7J?q70,
hf+%t and%@%, hat didnotalsoshowUPaSa ‘vVARp viOIatiOn
between 1971 and 1984. This is an important aspect of revealed-
preference approaches. There is no need to rely on large-sample prop-
erties of estimators, so if only the years 1971 to 1984, say, are of
interest, only data for those years need be included.
12 s j~la results were obtained for other countries; imPOsingnon-
negative income elasticities led to increased frequencies of violations.
by showing that trends or other “taste change”
factors are needed to keep the estimated system
consistent with prior beliefs about elasticities. 13
Results from the Australian Data
We made use of the Sakong and Hayes method to
retest the consistency of quarterly meat consump-
tion data from Australia, subject to restrictions on
expenditure elasticities. The first set of restrictions
we tried was to set every expenditure elasticity
equal to 1.0, This was suggested by Chalfant and
Alston as a benchmark case for compensating for
changes in expenditures. We found, using 48 ob-
servations (1977:1 to 1988:4), that a number of
data points were inconsistent with the revealed-
preference conditions and unitary expenditure elas-
ticities.
Figure 4 shows the implied “taste changes” for
beef and chicken: the vertical axis measures the
change in demand needed to rationalize the obser-
vations, so that a positive value measures a shift
toward that good. The sum of all of the values of
beef over the 12-year period is 0.57 kg, and the
sum of all of the values for chicken is – 0.97 kg.
The mean values of quarterly per capita consump-
tion for these two meats, for the same observa-
tions, were 11.28 kg for beef and 5.10 kg for
chicken. Thus, the implied taste changes show a
cumulative shift toward beef and away from
chicken, This is certainly contrary to expectations,
given the usual hypotheses about taste changes.
Pork and lamb each were also subject to some
negative shifts, on average, with the sum over the
48 quarters for lamb being – 1.35 kg (against a
mean value of 3.91 for consumption), and the sum
for pork equal to – 0.38 kg (against mean con-
sumption of 3.89 kg), These cumulative sums
could be misleading because they mask the varia-
tion in the individual observations. For instance,
for beef, reducing any one of the three positive
spikes-observations 9 (1979:1), 27 (1983:3), and
47 (1988:3)—would be sufficient to eliminate (or
reverse) the positive overall effect; similarly, for
chicken, reducing either of the two negative
13Chalfmt and Wallace, in a productionstudy using VtiS13’S(1984)
Weak Axiom of Cost Minimization (WACM), found a number of vio-
lations of the cost-minimization assumption when amdyzing data from
trucking firms around the time of deregulationof the trucking industry.
They observed that there were characteristics of firms that helped to
explain these violations—supported by a logit analysis of the viola-
tions—which justified including tbe characteristics of firms as
“shifters” in parametric cost functions, Larson, Klotz, and Chien have
experimentedwith deterrrrininghow manyutility functions are necessary
to rationalize a cross-sectional data set.134 October 1992 NJARE
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spikes-observations 9 and 47—would be suffi-
cient to eliminate the negative overall effect.
One thing that can be learned from these results
is that there are interactions among the meats. For
instance, as we have already observed, the large
positive spikes for beef coincide in two of three
cases with large negative spikes for chicken. When
the largest deviation from consistency was found
for beef, a value of + 1.25 kg (in 1983:3), there
was a – 0.44 kg deviation for lamb and a – 1.14
kg deviation for pork. That observation’s chicken
quantity required no adjustments. Similarly, the
largest observed negative value for beef was in
observation 19(1981:3), when a – 0.63 kg decline
was estimated. At the same time, there were shifts
of +0.17 kg in favor of lamb, +0.21 kg in favor
of pork, and +0.56 kg in favor of chicken.
Not too much should be made of these results,
since the restriction that all expenditure elasticities
should equal 1.0 is not plausible. On the other
hand, it is clear from the plots that the shift in
preferences needed to reconcile the data is by no
means a systematic trend away from beef in favor
of chicken. The quarter-to-quarter shifts some-
times seem to dwarf the cumulative effect, in mag-
nitude. This suggests that it will be important, in
using the Sakong and Hayes procedure, to account
for the possible presence of measurement errors
and seasonality.
We tried one more experiment with these data.
We changed the constraint on the expenditure elas-
ticities, allowing them to vary between 0.5 and
2.0. Overall, this must decrease the extent to
which the data are found to be inconsistent with a
stable utility function, since a constraint has been
relaxed. 14However, it is also possible that the re-
sulting deviations from consistency will be more
systematic. Interestingly, we found very similar
results for beef and chicken when this alternative
set of constraints was tried. The sum of all fitted
taste-change values for beef was +0.58 kg, and
for chicken it was – 1.07 kg. The most dramatic
difference was a large reduction in the cumulative
effect on lamb, which dropped to a shift away from
lamb of 0.12 kg over the 48 quarters; these results
indicated that the expenditure elasticity of 1.0 was
too large for lamb, and relaxing that constraint
reduced the size of measured taste changes. Figure
14 ~i~ is w ~ore restrictive than the SakongandHayes requirement
of non-negativeexpendkureelasticities, althoughthey addeda constraint
on the size of the shift between elasticities from adjacent observations.
Whflean expenditureelasticity of 2.0 may seem largefor meatproducts,
note that this is with respect to meat expenditure, not total expendhure,
so to the extent that the income elasticity of overall meat expenditure is
less than 1.0, this number shouldbe scaled down somewhat to imputean
overall income elasticity.
5 shows, once more, the implied shifts in prefer-
ences. Note that the magnitudes are smaller, as
expected, and there appear to be more observations
for which no adjustment was necessary. Again, it
is interesting to note that the two large negative
spikes for chicken (in the same quarters as before)
are matched by two large positive spikes for beef.
As to whether to take these as measurement er-
rors or taste changes, we leave that for further
research. It is important to note the presence of
both positive and negative shifts for both beef and
chicken within the 48 observations. Thus, at least
some of the shifts have to be considered measure-
ment errors, or else we must treat preferences as
shifting back and forth, perhaps due to seasonal
shifts in preferences. No doubt a nontrivial com-
ponent of this shifting back and forth is due to
measurement errors, and also some may be due to
the fact that the income elasticity has been too
tightly bounded for beef. For example, if the in-
come elasticity of meat expenditure was 0.5, the
upper bound of 2.0 that we placed on expenditure
elasticities would translate to an income elasticity
of 1.0, which might be too small for beef. All of
our intuition about such elasticities is based on
parametric models, so we may be mixing tech-
niques if we bring those to bear on interpreting
nonparametric evidence; however, we found for
this data set that the fitted expenditure elasticities
using typical parametric demand systems are well
above 1.0 for beef, although they did not appear to
be above 2.0 (Alston and Chalfant 1991b).
In Sakong and Hayes, the fitted taste changes
Forbeef in the United States were mostly non-zero
md mostly in the same direction. Thus, Sakong
md Hayes observed that there would have to be
$ither a systematic measurement error-an under-
counting of beef consumption (due, perhaps, to
changes in trimming practices)+r a shift in pref-
erences away from beef to cause the sequence they
observed. Using the Varian (1985) or Tsur (1989)
approach, one could make an assumption about the
variance of measurement errors in quantities and
construct a statistical test of the significance of the
taste changes found by Sakong and Hayes. This
ignores one vital piece of information-the sign of
the individual shifts. If one has a sequence of im-
plied taste changes from this procedure, a runs test
or some other test of randomness seems more ap-
propriate than simply applying a test for overall
significance.
Conclusion
Nonparametric demand analysis permits utility
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has the potential to be more revealing than the
typical parametric study, if one is concerned over
possible specification errors and the difficulty of
interpreting a multitude of diagnostic tests for
structural change and/or model misspecification,
On the other hand, concerns have been raised
about the power of nonparametric tests. It is pos-
sible to find examples where two data points are
known to be inconsistent with stable preferences,
yet WARP or GARP are not violated. Little is
known about the relative chances of GARP and
parametric tests detecting structural change in typ-
ical data sets, although, if the frequencies of such
findings in the literature are any guide, the non-
parametric approach seems less likely to imply that
data are inconsistent with a stable, well-behaved
utility function. Of course, this may not mean that
the parametric approach has greater power. There
is a growing body of evidence about the problem
of false inferences from misspecified parametric
models. Much progress has been made in adding
power to the nonparametric approach and in reduc-
ing the tendency toward false rejections using
parametric methods, and they are becoming in-
creasingly good complements to one another,
It is not clear that the nonparametric approach
will reject less often than the parametric approach
when prior information is imposed. Sakong and
Hayes reached essentially the same conclusions
with the nonparametric approach, for instance, as
did Moschini and Meilke with an almost ideal de-
mand system. To the extent that prior beliefs about
elasticities are less arguable than those about func-
tional forms, the Sakong and Hayes procedure rep-
resents a promising innovation in the nonparamet-
ric approach. It should not be difficult to extend
their approach to restrict substitution responses as
well as income effects. For instance, could we
constrain the partial effects in both beef and
chicken consumption, after a decrease in the pork
price, to be negative?
We hope to have some results available soon
that show the effects of imposing prior beliefs
about substitution effects and also that make use of
exogenous variables to detect any patterns in the
taste changes. One could do this with some mea-
sure of health concerns, for example, to see if the
implied taste changes yielded by the Sakong and
Hayes approach can be explained by news about
cholesterol. Also, the effects of advertising can be
tested in this manner. For instance, the measured
shifts in demand could be regressed against adver-
tising variables to provide a new measure of the
effectiveness of advertising. Finally, there may be
seasonal patterns in the inconsistencies that may
provide a basis for testing for seasonality and for
adjusting for it.
It seems essential to continue to work toward
finding a measure of standard error for the fitted
taste-change values. We doubt whether any of the
accumulated sums of taste-change effects that we
found would be statistically significantly different
from zero, given the amount of random variation
there appears to be. This will no doubt depend,
however, on how much can be attributed to sys-
tematic components such as any seasonality, and
on what additional constraints are imposed. In any
event, the results do suggest that the absence of
any large taste changes is supported by the Sakong
and Hayes procedure. Even with a strong restric-
tion on expenditure elasticities, there does not ap-
pear to be a large change that is systematic away
from red meats toward chicken. Relaxing the con-
straint to allow income elasticities to lie within a
plausible range based on prior beliefs leads to es-
sentially the same conclusion.
In conclusion, there is much potential and great
appeal in the nonparametric approach to demand
analysis. There is also much reason for caution.
No one would suggest that it will replace familiar
parametric methods based on regression models.
On the other hand, it appears that the method can
complement parametric studies in many ways. It
focuses attention on the data, rather than the prop-
erties of particular tests for structural change; per-
mits utility theory alone to be imposed on the data;
and makes it convenient for prior beliefs about
economic behavior, as opposed to functional
forms, to be included in the analysis. Especially as
progress is made in incorporating measurement er-
rors and providing a firm statistical foundation, the
method should prove increasingly useful.
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